Summary .-Unconscious priming is sensitive to contextual factors. The present study examined this adaptive process using masked arrow primes (<< or >>). Some targets required specifi c "fi xed" left/right responses (<< or >>) and others required "free" left/right responses (<>). Diff erent groups ( n = 30 each) received responsecongruent primes (SOA = 75 msec.) on 0.2, 0.5, or 0.8 of the fi xed-response trials. Fixed responses were facilitated by congruent primes and free responses were faster when congruent with the prime. Critically, these masked priming eff ects emerged only in the 0.8 group. The pattern of extant prime-proportion eff ects in this paradigm best supports an adaptive associative-strength account rather than memoryrecruitment or response-bias-suppression accounts.
The possibility that unconscious priming refl ects a "smart" adaptive process rather than a "dumb" ballistic one is currently receiving a good deal of debate (for a recent review, see Desender & Van den Bussche, 2012 ) . Traditionally, unconscious processes were purported to be automatic and contextually invariant, but recent evidence suggests this is not the case (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2001 ) . Assuming fl exibility of unconscious processes is genuine and is not the result of undetected conscious processes, the question remains how this fl exibility is achieved by the cognitive system. On this issue, the current experiment was designed to distinguish between accounts of how masked priming becomes tuned to a manipulation of the prime context of which participants are unaware.
The present experiment represents an extension of Bodner and Mulji (2010 ) , who were the fi rst to show a parallel infl uence of a prime-proportion manipulation on two masked priming eff ects. Fixed-response trials had double-arrow targets (<< vs. >>) , and left/right responses to the target were facilitated when the double-arrow prime pointed in the same direction as the target (congruent-prime trials) vs opposite directions (incongruent-prime trials), replicating earlier studies (e.g., Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000 ; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002 ) . Furthermore, replicating Klapp (2007 ) , masked priming was greater when the proportion of congruent-prime trials was 0.8 rather than 0.2. Bodner and Mulji (2010 ) reported a second form of masked priming that occurred on free-response trials that were interleaved with fi xed-response trials. When a bidirectional arrow target was presented (< >), participants were "free" to press either the left or right response key. Freechoice responses were faster when they were congruent (vs. incongruent) with the direction of the masked arrow prime, and were more likely to be congruent as well, consistent with earlier fi ndings (e.g., Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004 ; Klapp & Haas, 2005 ; Kiesel, Wagener, Kunde, Hoff mann, Fallgatter, & Stöcker, 2006 ; Schlaghecken, Klapp, & Maylor, 2009 ; O'Conner & Neill, 2011 ) . Bodner and Mulji's novel fi nding was that free-choice priming was also greater in the 0.8 (vs 0.2) proportion-congruent group. Bodner and Mulji (2010 ) interpreted these priming eff ects using a memory-recruitment account, building on its application to other masked priming eff ects (for a review, see Bodner & Masson, 2014 ) . This account assumes that the processing applied to a masked prime is encoded and is then more likely to be recruited to assist target processing when the prime context warrants recruitment. Bodner and Mulji suggested that unconscious attunement to proportion of congruent primes on fi xed trials carries over to infl uence free responses. These fl exible priming eff ects challenge accounts in which primes automatically activate their corresponding motor responses (e.g., Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec'H, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene-Lambertz, et al ., 1998 ) .
Alternatively, these fi xed-and free-response priming eff ects might refl ect an adaptive automatic process. In particular, Klapp (2007 ) posited that the strength of the stimulus-response association between a prime and its response increases as the proportion congruent increases, due to the increased number of learning opportunities. Consistent with his adaptive associativestrength account, Klapp reported that facilitation from congruent arrow primes at a 32-msec. SOA increased as the proportion of congruent-prime trials increased from 0.2 to 0.5 to 0.8 across groups. At a 160-msec. SOA Klapp found the reverse pattern, namely faster responses after incongruent primes, and this negative priming eff ect decreased across the 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 groups. This reversal in the direction of priming typically emerges only at SOAs above 100 msec. To explain this reversal, Schlaghecken and Eimer (2000 ) have suggested that masked arrow primes induce a response activation process, rapidly followed by a response inhibition process. Inhibiting the prime response is argued to be adaptive if a target requiring that response is not likely to be presented very soon after the prime. Klapp's priming reversal at the longer SOA suggests that a weaker association between a prime and its opposite response occurs when more of the trials involve congruent primes. Perry and Lupker (2010 ) noted that the memory-recruitment account incorrectly predicts facilitation from congruent primes across SOAs, be-cause the overlap between prime and target processing remains the same across SOAs. Perry and Lupker also reported an experiment measuring free-response priming (as in Bodner & Mulji, 2010 ) across three proportion-congruent groups (as in Klapp, 2007 ) . However, because congruentprime proportions of 0, 0.5, and 1 were chosen, the two extreme groups received only one kind of fi xed-response trial and hence fi xed-choice priming could not be measured (a limitation this study addresses). In other words, the eff ect of proportion congruence could only be measured on free responses. At a 77-msec. SOA, facilitation of prime-congruent free choices was not signifi cant in the 0 group (and was equal in the 0.5 and 1 groups). At a 165-msec. SOA, in contrast, free choices were slower when congruent (vs. incongruent) with the prime, and this interference eff ect occurred only in the 0 group.
To explain this pattern, Perry and Lupker (2010 ) proposed a responsebias-suppression account. They argued that in the absence of congruentprime trials, participants attempted to suppress the prime response "by decreasing the activation of the primed response, which, in turn, allowed the competing response to become more active" (p. 534). Suppression of the prime response in the 0 group thus eliminated free-response facilitation at the short SOA, while allowing a reversal to emerge at the long SOA due to the inhibitory process. In the 0.5 and 1 groups, there was no incentive for the cognitive system to suppress prime-activated responses. Therefore, in these groups a context-insensitive response-activation process operated, yielding equivalent free-response priming eff ects.
The response-bias suppression account is unique in claiming that different mechanisms contribute to priming across prime-proportion manipulations. When congruent-prime trials occur at least half the time, priming is driven by a context-insensitive activation mechanism. In contrast, when congruent-prime trials occur less than half the time, an adaptive prime-response suppression mechanism operates to counteract the activation process. The memory-recruitment account predicts that prime recruitment increases as the proportion of congruent primes increases, but the point at which recruitment will be maximized depends, as memory retrieval does, on context and task factors. For example, when the diffi culty of target processing varied substantially across trials, Bodner and Masson (2001 ) found robust masked repetition priming in a lexical decision task even when only 0.2 (vs 0.8) of the trials involved repetition primes. Finally, the adaptive associative-strength account also predicts that stronger stimulus-response links will be formed as the proportion of congruent-prime increases.
As noted earlier, Perry and Lupker (2010 ) could not measure the infl uence of the proportion of congruent primes on fi xed-response priming in their design. Moreover, the response suppression they hypothesized might occur only when primes are never congruent. Therefore, the current experiment was conducted to better compare these three accounts of prime-proportion eff ects on masked priming. Specifi cally, both fi xed-response and free-response priming (cf. Klapp, 2007 ) were measured across groups that received congruent primes on either 0.2, 0.5, or 0.8 of the fi xedresponse trials.
Hypothesis 1 . The response-bias-suppression account predicts a selective reduction in both types of priming in the 0.2 group, and also predicts equal priming eff ects in the 0.5 and 0.8 groups. Hypothesis 2 . The memory-recruitment and adaptive associativestrength accounts predict that priming should increase across these prime-proportion groups and hence should be largest in the 0.8 group.
METHOD
Participants University of Calgary undergraduates participated for psychology course credit and were randomly assigned to the 0.2, 0.5, or 0.8 proportion-congruent groups ( n = 30 each).
Stimuli
Primes and fi xed-response targets were left or right double-arrows (<< or >>). The target on free-response trials was a bidirectional arrow (< >). Postmasks were randomly generated strings of fi ve uppercase consonants (excluding consonants containing arrow-like angles). Stimuli were presented in black 72-point Courier font on a light grey background.
Design
Each participant received 5 blocks of 100 trials. The fi rst block was treated as practice, as in Bodner and Mulji (2010 ) . Each block contained 60 fi xed-response trials (30 of each target type) and 40 free-response trials, presented in a randomized order. Across groups, 0.2, 0.5, or 0.8 of the fi xed-response trials had congruent primes (equally split between leftand right-arrow targets) and the remainder had incongruent primes. Half of the free-response trials in each block had left-arrow primes and half had right-arrow primes.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually using a Macintosh computer. Stimulus displays were synchronized with the monitor's refresh cycle to allow exact timing in 15-msec. intervals. Each trial consisted of a prime (30 msec.), a postmask (45 msec.), and a target (105 msec.), with 0 msec. interstimulus intervals; the prime-target SOA was 75 msec. The RT was measured from target onset. The intertrial interval was 1 sec. On fi xed-response trials, participants pressed the left or right key on a response box using their index fi ngers to indicate the left/right direction of the target. On free-response trials, participants were asked to freely choose which of the two keys to press, and were also asked to avoid a set strategy (e.g., always pressing the same key). A "TOO SLOW" prompt was presented for 1 sec. if an RT exceeded 1 sec. Accuracy feedback was not provided.
After the experiment participants were asked, "What did you see on each trial, just before the target was presented?" Follow-up questions assessed their subjective awareness of the primes. Participants then completed a prime-judgment task in which they tried to identify the direction of each arrow prime under the same trial specifi cations used in the main experiment. They received 50 congruent and 50 incongruent fi xed-response trials (half of each with a left-arrow target and half with a right-arrow target), and 50 free-response trials (half with left-arrow prime, half with rightarrow prime) in a random order. Accuracy feedback was not provided.
Analysis
Experimental trials with RTs below 150 msec. or above 3000 msec. were excluded from analysis (0.2%), as in Bodner and Mulji (2010 ) . Eff ects were deemed signifi cant at the 0.05 level except as noted. Eta-squared (η 2 ) is reported as a measure of eff ect size. For fi xed-response trials, mean RT for correct responses and mean error rates were each analyzed using a 2 × 3 mixed-factor ANOVA with priming (congruent vs. incongruent) as the within factor and proportion-congruent group (0.2 vs 0.5 vs 0.8) as the between factor. For free-response trials, mean RT was analyzed using a mixed-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) with response type (prime congruent vs. prime incongruent) as the within factor and proportion-congruent group (0.2 vs 0.5 vs 0.8) as the between factor. A one-way ANOVA with group as the factor was conducted on the proportion of prime-congruent responses on free-response trials. The occurrence of a bias pattern in both fi xed-and free-responses was also evaluated as outlined below.
RESULTS

Masking Eff ectiveness
The primes were eff ectively masked. Only three participants reported subjective awareness of the arrow primes, and in the prime-judgment task participants were not above chance at discriminating the direction of the arrow primes ( M d' = 0.03; t 88 = 1.57, SE = 0.02, p = .12). Table 1 provides the fi xed-response trial means and Table 2 provides the ANOVA results. The critical result in both the RT and error rate anal-ysis was an interaction between proportion-congruence and priming. In both measures, fi xed-response priming was a statistically signifi cant eff ect only in the 0.8 proportion-congruent group. In the RTs, additional tests showed that fi xed-choice priming was larger in the 0.8 group (27 msec.) than in either the 0.5 group (5 msec.; F 1, 58 = 16.69, MSE = 215, η 2 = 0.22), or the 0.2 group (−3 msec.; F 1, 58 = 27.13, MSE = 261, η 2 = 0.32). The same was true in the error rates: fi xed-response priming was larger in the 0.8 group (6.5%) than in either the 0.5 group (2.3%; F 1, 58 = 4.52, MSE = 30, η 2 = 0.07), or the 0.2 group (0%; F 1, 58 = 12.26, MSE = 26, η 2 = 0.17). Priming eff ects were too small in the 0.2 and 0.5 groups to warrant statistical comparisons. Table 3 provides the free-response means and Table 2 provides the ANOVA results for the RT measure. Consistent with the fi xed-response analyses, free responses were signifi cantly faster when congruent with the primed response, but this free-response priming eff ect was signifi cant only in the 0.8 group. Free-response priming was not signifi cantly larger in the 0.8 group (12 msec.) than in the 0.5 group (9 msec.) ( F < 1), but it was signifi cantly larger in the 0.8 group than in the 0.2 group (−4 msec.; F 1, 58 = 6.26, MSE = 608, η 2 = 0.10); the diff erence between the 0.5 and 0.2 groups was not signifi cant ( F 1, 58 = 3.19, MSE = 370, p = .08, η 2 = 0.05).
Fixed-response Priming
Free-response Priming
The proportion of prime-congruent responses also diff ered across groups ( F 2, 87 = 10.25, MSE = 31, η 2 = 0.19). Preference for the primed response was greater in the 0.8 group (53.7%) than in either the 0.5 group (47.5%; F 1, 58 = 14.80, MSE = 39, η 2 = 0.20) or the 0.2 group (48.8%; F 1, 58 = 10.13, MSE = 35, η 2 = 0.15). Only the 0.8 group chose the primed response significantly more often than chance ( t 29 = 2.75, SE = 1.35).
Bias Eff ects on Fixed-and Free-response Priming
Prime-proportion eff ects often show a bias pattern: RTs on congruentprime trials decrease when the proportion of congruent trials is high, but error rates on incongruent-prime trials also increase ( Bodner & Dypvik, 2005 ; Bodner & Mulji, 2010 ) . This bias pattern also occurred here. A oneway ANOVA on RTs on congruent-prime trials showed a diff erence across proportion-congruent groups ( F 2, 87 = 7.66, MSE = 2,664, η 2 = 0.15). Congruent-prime RTs were faster in the 0.8 group than in either the 0.5 group ( F 1, 58 = 5.94, MSE = 2,907, η 2 = 0.09), or the 0.2 group ( F 1, 58 = 19.30, MSE = 2,042, η 2 = 0.25), and were similar in the 0.2 and 0.5 groups ( F 1, 58 = 1.48, MSE = 3,044, p = .23, η 2 = 0.02). Errors on incongruent-prime trials also diff ered across groups ( F 2, 87 = 5.81, MSE = 77, η 2 = 0.12). Errors were not signifi cantly more frequent on in- congruent-prime trials in the 0.8 group than in the 0.5 group ( F 1, 58 = 1.76, MSE = 109, p = .19, η 2 = 0.03), but they were more frequent in the 0.8 group than in the 0.2 group ( F 1, 58 = 12.32, MSE = 72, η 2 = 0.18) and in the 0.5 group than in the 0.2 group ( F 1, 58 = 5.19, MSE = 49, η 2 = 0.08). On free-response trials, RTs for prime-congruent responses diff ered across groups ( F 2, 87 = 5.45, MSE = 4,356, η 2 = 0.11). Specifi cally, prime-congruent responses were marginally faster in the 0.8 group than in the 0.5 group ( F 1, 58 = 3.71, MSE = 5,015, p = .06, η 2 = 0.06), and signifi cantly faster than in the 0.2 group ( F 1, 58 = 13.60, MSE = 3,409, η 2 = 0.19); the 0.5 and 0.2 groups were not signifi cantly diff erent ( F 1, 58 = 1.34, MSE = 4,643, p = .25, η 2 = 0.02). RTs for prime-incongruent responses also diff ered across groups ( F 2, 87 = 3.69, MSE = 3,590, η 2 = 0.06). Prime-incongruent responses were marginally faster in the 0.8 group than in the 0.5 group ( F 1, 58 = 3.62, MSE = 4,200, p = .06, η 2 = 0.06), and signifi cantly faster than in the 0.2 group ( F 1, 58 = 10.55, MSE = 2,237, η 2 = 0.15); the 0.5 and 0.2 groups were not signifi cantly diff erent ( F < 1). In general, the 0.8 proportion-congruent group made the fastest free-choice responses.
DISCUSSION
Replicating Bodner and Mulji (2010 ) , masked priming of both fi xedand free-choice responses to arrow targets occurred, but here these eff ects were signifi cant only when the majority of the fi xed-response trials had congruent primes.
3 Critically, priming eff ects were typically larger in the 0.8 than in the 0.5 proportion-congruent group. Klapp (2007 ) also found that proportion-congruent fi xed-response priming increased across the 0.5 and 0.8 groups. This pattern challenges Perry and Lupker's (2010 ) claim that participants unconsciously suppress the prime response selectively when the proportion of congruent trials is low. By their response-bias suppression account, priming should have been equivalent in the 0.5 and 0.8 groups (where priming is driven solely by automatic processes) and reduced in the 0.2 group (where prime-induced response biases are suppressed).
In contrast, the emergence of priming eff ects primarily in the 0.8 group and their bias-eff ect pattern are both consistent with the memory-recruitment account's claim that a higher proportion of task-valid primes leads to increased prime recruitment ( Bodner & Mulji, 2010 ; see also Bodner, Mas-son, & Richard, 2006 ) . However, these two results are also consistent with the adaptive associative-strength account's claim that prime-response links are strengthened as the proportion of prime-congruent trials increases ( Klapp, 2007 ) . An advantage of the memory-recruitment account is that it also predicts prime-proportion eff ects in priming paradigms where each prime and target occurs once and where response priming is controlled (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2001 ). The adaptive associative-strength account cannot explain such eff ects. On the other hand, a challenge to the memory-recruitment account is that overlap between prime and target on congruent trials should always produce facilitation. Thus, the memory-recruitment account cannot explain why response-congruent primes slow responses at prime-target SOAs above 100 msec., as noted by Perry and Lupker (2010 ) . Other challenges to the memory-recruitment account are reviewed in Bodner and Masson (2014 ) .
The occurrence of negative response-priming eff ects poses a challenge for a fourth account of prime-proportion eff ects on masked priming. In Kinoshita, Forster, and Mozer's (2008 ) adaptation-to-the-statistics-of-the-environment account, the cognitive system tracks current and recent trial difficulty (which is infl uenced by prime proportions), and adjusts its response timing to maximize effi ciency. By this account, congruent (vs. incongruent) prime trials should be less diffi cult (and thus faster); thus, congruent primes should always yield facilitation.
Not only are responses-even free-choice responses-sensitive to unconscious infl uences, but the extent and even the direction of those unconscious infl uences appear to be fl exible and dynamic. Although a unitary account of prime-proportion eff ects across masked priming paradigms may not be possible, prime-proportion eff ects on response priming and the reversal in priming across SOA provide two critical fi ndings for discriminating between candidate accounts. Because the adaptive automaticactivation account uses the same unconscious learning mechanism to account for both positive and negative priming eff ects across SOAs, it seems to be the best account of extant prime-proportion eff ects in the responsepriming paradigm.
